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Abstract—The incorporation of stochastic loads and generation
into the operation of power grids gives rise to an exposure
to stochastic risk. This risk has been addressed in prior work
through a variety of mechanisms, such as scenario generation
or chance constraints, that can be incorporated into OPF
computations. Nevertheless, numerical experiments reveal that
the resulting operational decisions can produce power flows with
very high variance. In this paper we introduce a variety of convex
variants of OPF that explicitly address the interplay of (power
flow) variance with cost minimization, and present numerical
experiments that highlight our contributions.
Index Terms—Chance-constraints, stochastic generation, OPF.
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing levels of renewable penetration have resulted
in associated risk, principally through potential equipment
overloads. A growing body of research has tackled this issue
through proposed modifications to power engineering prac-
tices, in particular by suggesting alternative, risk-aware formu-
lations to the Optimal Power Flow (OPF) problem that may
additionally incorporate appropriate balancing mechanisms.
See e.g. [1]–[11], [4] and citations therein.
The application of these methodologies yields operational
plans within the scope of an OPF computation that guarantee
protection from stochastic variations in generation (or loads).
For example, in the chance-constrained case, one obtains a set
of dispatch decisions and possibly participation factors (which
describe balancing control) that guarantee that the probability
that any given line becomes overloaded is at most a given
value  > 0, under appropriate assumptions on renewable
stochasticity.
However, experiments with such schemes produce cases
where power flows are highly variable, or more precisely
some transmission lines will have power flows with high
variance. We posit that this behavior is undesirable from a
real-time operational perspective. See [12], which highlights
the impact of power flow variability on voltage profile and
transformer operation. High variability may also hinder system
understanding and control, as well as pricing mechanisms (see
[13], [14], [15] for work on pricing under uncertainty). [16]
considers minimization of variance of slack bus injection.
In this paper we propose a set different alternatives to
risk-aware OPF computations, which we term variance-aware
OPF. In these variants we explicitly account for power flow
variance, either as a post-processing step for the initial risk-
aware OPF computation, or by explicitly incorporating a mea-
sure of power flow variance into a risk-aware OPF formulation
so as to obtain a convex optimization problem.
II. NOTATION AND BASIC FORMULATIONS
In this paper we will focus on the linearized, or DC
model for power flows. We will use the following selected
nomenclature, with additional terms described later:
B = set of buses, n = |B|; B = bus susceptance matrix.
Bˆ = B, with the last row and column removed
B˘ =
[
Bˆ−1 0
0 0
]
; B˘i = ith row of B˘.
θi = phase angle at bus i, θ¯i = E(θi).
E = set of lines; m = |E|.
fmaxij , bij = power flow limit, and susceptance, for line ij ∈ E .
fij = power flow on line ij, f¯ij = E(fij) = bij(θ¯i − θ¯j)
piij
.
= B˘Ti − B˘Tj for each line ij ∈ E
G = set of generator buses; we assume at most one generator
per bus
pmini , p
max
i = minimum and maximum output of i ∈ G.
S = set of stochastic injection buses, µk + ωk = stochastic
injection at bus b ∈ B,
• µk = constant, ωk = zero-mean random variable.
• µk = ωk = 0 if k /∈ S,
• Ω = covariance of ω, an n× n matrix,
• W = set of vectors ω under consideration.
R = set of buses participating in balancing
A = matrix of participation factors; αij = (i,j)-entry of A,
• A is n× n
• αij = 0 if i /∈ R or j /∈ S
• V(A) = vector with entries b2ijpiTij(I −A)Ω(I −AT )piij
(variances) for ij ∈ E
K = convex set of allowable participation factor matrices
p = vector of generation amounts, extended to all b ∈ B
(forcing pb = 0 when b /∈ B).
c(p) = (convex) cost of generation vector p.
d= (fixed) vector of loads.
Using this notation, we can write a DC-OPF formulation:
min
p
c(p) (1a)
s.t. Bθ = p − d (1b)
∀ij ∈ E : bij |θi − θj | ≤ fmaxij (1c)
∀i ∈ G : pmini ≤ pi ≤ pmaxi (1d)
As is well-known, constraints (1b)-(1c) can be simplified by
using a pseudo-inverse for the matrix B (see, e.g. [1], [3]).
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Namely, for each line ij the power flow on ij equals bijpiTij(p−
d) thereby reducing (1b)-(1c) to the system
∀ij ∈ E : bij |piTij(p− d)| ≤ fmaxij (2)
III. SECURITY-CONSTRAINED FORMULATIONS
Previous work [1], [3], [4], [9], [17], [7], [2], [5] has
focused on modifications to power flow computations in order
to account for uncertain injections, and in particular to model
the use of balancing. We will first outline some of this work.
Second, we will also describe a sparse formulation for
security-constrained DC-OPF problems, as a straightforward
extension of the approach used in [1], [3], [9]. This will be
the starting point for the discussions in Section V, where we
will discuss how to make the formulation variance-aware.
The method used in [1], [3], [9], modifies the DC-OPF
computation so that its primary output consists of a vector p¯ of
controllable generation amounts (which can only be positive
at controllable generators) and (as in [9]) an n× n matrix A
used to model balancing. Given ω ∈ W the balancing vector
is given by Aω, so that the stochastic output of a controllable
generator at bus i is
pi = pi(ω) = p¯i − [Aω]i = p¯i −
∑
j∈B
αijωj (3)
where we assume that when i is not a controllable generator
bus then αij = 0 for all j. Thus, the net injection vector equals
p¯− d+ µ+ ω−Aω. In order to actually attain balancing we
must have
∀w ∈ W :
∑
i∈B
(p¯− d+ µ+ ω −Aω)i = 0, (4)
a stochastic requirement. Let us assume that we additionally
assume
∑
i∈B(p¯ − d + µ)i = 0, i.e. the system is balanced
when ω = 0. Then (4) is equivalent to
∀ω ∈ W : ωi −
∑
j∈B
αijωj = 0, ∀ i ∈ B. (5)
As pointed out in [9] in order to attain this condition it is
sufficient to require
1 =
∑
j∈B
αij ∀ i ∈ B. (6)
Note that (5) describes a hyperplane in ω-space. If W is
full dimensional then (6) is actually necessary for (4) [18].
Additionally we may constrain A in a number of ways (e.g.
the αij constrained by bounds). In particular, we could require
that for any bus i ∈ R 1, αij = αik for every j 6= k (termed
a “global” policy in [9]).
Notation. In what follows we will write A ∈ K to denote a set
of generic convex constraints that A must satisfy, including in
particular (6).
1Henceforth, a participating bus.
Using these notations, if fij denotes (stochastic) flow on
line ij then
∀ij ∈ E : fij = bijpiTij(p¯− d+ µ+ ω −Aω), (7a)
E(fij) = bijpi
T
ij(p¯− d+ µ). (7b)
Likewise by construction
V(A)ij .= Var(fij) = b2ijVar(piTij(I −A)ω) =
b2ijpi
T
ij(I −A)Ω(I −AT )piij (8)
The next modeling ingredient concerns security constraints.
A variety of variants of the basic problem (1) can be obtained
depending on how we model stochasticity and security and on
whether the matrix A is an optimization variable or is fixed
(i.e. given as an input). A typical approach concerns chance
constraints. To fix ideas, consider a line ij. Then we wish to
impose that
P(|fij | > fmaxij ) <  (9)
where 0 <  < 1 is a given threshold. In order to represent
(9) in a convex manner, prior work has assumed normally
distributed of ω. Under such an assumption (9) is equivalent
to
|E(fij)| + Φ−1(1− )Std(fij) ≤ fmaxij (10)
where Φ−1(1− ) is the -quantile for a normal distribution.
Using (7) and (8), we obtain that (10) is SOCP representable
[1], [3] (also see below).
A. Modifications used in this paper
Our first modification will be to replace (10) with
|E(fij)| + νij Std(fij) ≤ fmaxij (11)
where νij is a safety parameter. As seen above, in the Gaussian
case (11) is equivalent to (9) if we choose νij = Φ−1(1− ).
However, the Gaussian case is not the only one where such an
equivalence holds; other examples of distributions of interest
include (multivariate) truncated Gaussians, uniform distribu-
tions on ellipsoidal supports, and others. This requires a
distribution-dependent choice νij = νij(). Further (11) can
be used to tightly approximate distributionally robust chance
constraints. See [19] (and e.g. Theorem 2.1 therein). Similar
remarks apply to security constraints involving generators.
We would argue that even when the stochastics of ω is
complex so that we cannot provide a rigorous choice for the
safety parameters, we may still be able to compute Ω, or
perhaps a data-driven estimate for it. The safety-parameter
approach could still hold appeal from an intuitive, if imprecise,
perspective. We will term (11) a safety constraint.
In order to present our modification to chance-constrained
DC-OPF, we first produce a new expression for the variance
of a line flow fij . Let us write
D
.
= B˘A, and (12)
∀ k ∈ S : γij,k .= B˘ik − B˘jk −Dik +Djk. (13)
Lemma 1. For any line ij, the variance of flow on ij under
scheme (3) is given by
Var(fij) = b
2
ij γij Ω γ
T
ij (14)
Remark: we stress that this expression holds without any
assumption on the underlying probability distributions. Denote
the generation cost at a bus i as ci(p)
.
= ci0p
2 +ci1p+ci0, and
let the ith row of A be denoted by Ai. Then (routine proof):
Lemma 2. For a bus i, Var(pi) = ATi ΩAi, and E(ci(pi)) =
ci0(p¯
2
i +ATi ΩAi) + ci1p¯i + ci2.
Our safety-constrained formulation, given next, generalizes
the chance-constrained formulation in [3]. As before we write
n = |B| and also m = |E|. We are given nonnegative a safety
parameter νij for each line ij and likewise safety parameters νi
for generators (= 0 at non-generator buses). The formulation
uses variables p¯, θ¯ (n-vectors), f¯ (m-vector), A, D (|S| × |S|
and n× |S| matrices, respectively), and γ and s (an m× |S|
matrix and m-vector, respectively). As above, we use A ∈ K
to denote a given set of convex constraints on A.
min
∑
i∈G
E(ci(pi)) (15a)
s.t. A ∈ K (15b)
Bθ¯ = p¯+ µ− d (15c)
f¯ij = bij(θi − θ¯j) (15d)
bij |f¯ij |+ νij sij ≤ fmaxij ∀ij ∈ E , (15e)
B˘A = D (15f)
γij,k = B˘i,k − B˘j,k −Di,k +Dj,k, ∀ij ∈ E , k ∈ B
(15g)
sij ≥ bij
√
γijΩγTij ∀ij ∈ E (15h)
∀i ∈ G :
pmini + νi
√
ATi ΩAi ≤ p¯i ≤ pmaxi − νi
√
ATi ΩAi. (15i)
Equations (7) and Lemma (1), together with constraints (15c)-
(15h) imply that (15e) correctly states the desired line safety
constraint. Similarly with the generator safety constraints.
Problem (15) is a convex quadratically constrained optimiza-
tion problem that can, in principle, be solved using standard
optimization software. We call this the sparse formulation.
Next we analyze the structure of this formulation, in light of
the fact that previous work [9], [3], [17] has highlighted nu-
merical difficulties in solving chance-constrained formulations
for relatively large systems. Thus it is important to point out
that our formulation in fact can be greatly reduced in size.
In particular, as denoted in Section II and in the remarks
following Lemma 1 if a bus j /∈ S then αij = 0 for every bus
i, and if bus i /∈ R then αij = 0 for every j. In summary we
have:
Lemma 3. In the sparse formulation, the number of A, D and
γ variables is, respectively, |R||S|, n|S| and mS|. In addition
we also have the θ¯, f¯ and p variables, which number 2n+m.
The number of nonzeros in all constraints (15f) and (15h) is
n|R||S| and m|S|, respectively.
We note here are several variants of the above safety-
constrained problem that could be meaningful. First, there has
been recent work on how to avoid the normality assumption
[20]. Another alternative would be to rely on scenario mod-
eling (see e.g. [2]), or to use a distributionally robust model
with underlying normality [4].
IV. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section we consider some simple examples of
security-constrained problems (15) so as to examine the trade-
off between cost and various measures of line flow variance.
Consider the following example:
0
1
a
b
k
b = stochastic node
0,1,...,k+1 = generators
1, ...,k+1 = participating
 b = load
generators
k+1
k+2 
k+D
Figure 1. High-variance example.
Here,
• Quantities k and D are large
• Bus b has a load of L units.
• The stochastic output at bus b is indicated by ω, with
mean µ < L and variance σ2.
• Bus i (0 ≤ i ≤ k + 1) is a generator with linear cost
function given by ci1pi.
Assume c01 < c11 = c21 . . . ck1 < ck+1,1.
• The generator at bus 0 is large (capacity larger than L)
and non-participating.
• Generators at buses 1, 2, . . . , k + 1 are all participating,
with zero lower limit and safety parameters of value 3.
• Buses a, k + 1, . . . , k + D have no load, no generation
and no stochastic injection.
• We assume (for the first analysis) that all line limits are
large.
Let us write the participating factor for generator i ≥ 1 as αi.
Consider the following candidate solution:
p¯0 = L− µ− 3σ (16a)
αi = 1/k and p¯i = 3σ/k, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. (16b)
αk+1 = p¯k+1 = 0. (16c)
Lemma 4. The solution stipulated by (16) is the unique
optimal solution for the case of problem (15) in Figure 1.
Proof. First we argue that the solution we gave is feasible. The
generation at bus i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) equals 3σ/k−ω/k. Hence the
security constraint at bus i is satisfied. Also, total generation
equals L − 3σ + 3σ − ω = L. Thus indeed the solution is
feasible. Now consider any other feasible solution given by
values pˆi and αi (average generation and participating factor
at bus i). Define P =
∑k+1
i=1 pˆi. Then pˆ0 = L − µ − P , and
so the cost of the solution is
c01(L− µ− P ) + c11(P − pk+1) + ck+1,1pˆk+1 ≥ (17)
c01(L− µ− P ) + c11P. (18)
Here the inequality is strict unless pk+1 = 0. Further, pˆi ≥
3αiσ and
∑
i αi = 1. So, P ≥ 3σ. The proof is now complete.
Let us now consider the stochastic flow on line ab, which
equals L−µ−ω, and therefore has variance σ2. In other words
line ab is exposed to 100% of stochastic injection variance.
(Additional comments, below). The sum of line flow variances
equals σ2(1 + 1/k) ≈ σ2 for k large.
Suppose we were to aim for a decrease of variance
on this line by 50%. This goal will be achieved by
setting
∑k
i=1 αi =
√
.5 and thus αk+1 ≈ 0.293. In
that case the sum of variances will be larger than
.5σ2 + (D + 1)α2k+1σ
2 ≈ (.5 + (.293)2(D + 1))σ2.
With D = 10 this quantity equals approximately 1.44σ2
and the sum of line flow variances has substantially increased!
In the previous example we assumed that line limits were
large. However, it is simple to adapt the example to that were
line limits are small enough that the safety constraints become
significant. At the same time, it is of interest to consider an
alternative variance metric that takes into account line limits.
A compelling metric is the sum, over all lines, of the ratio of
flow variance to square of line limit. To address this metric
we modify the data in the example above by assuming:
• µ = L/4 and σ = µ/2 = L/8.
• The limit for lines 0a and ab equals 9L/8.
• The limit for all lines ia (1 ≤ i ≤ k) and for the lines
on the path from k + 1 to b are all equal to 2σ.
• All line safety parameters have value 3.
We can verify that the solution given by (16) remains feasible,
in which case a close reading of Lemma 4 shows that it
remains the sole optimal solution. To verify feasibility, note
that the expected flow on line ab equals 3L/4 and its standard
deviation equals L/8; since the limit for that line is 9L/8 it
follows that the safety constraint is satisfied (exactly), and
likewise with the remaining lines. Thus feasibility of (16)
holds, and it is straightforward to show that Lemma 4 still
holds.
Further, let us consider the variance metric (sum of ratios
of line flow variances to square of line limits) in solution
(16). Line ab contributes 1/81 to the sum whereas each line
ia contributes equals 1/(4k2). Hence the total metric equals
1/81 + 1/(4k) ≈ .0123 for k large. If, as above we desire to
decrease the variance on line ab by 50% then we again set
αk+1 = 1 −
√
.5 ≈ .293. We also set p¯k+1 = 3αk+1. Since
the line limit on the path from k + 1 to b is 2σ > 6αk+1
it follows that this solution is indeed feasible for (15).
The variance metric for the new solution is (more than)
0.5/81 + (.293)2(D + 1)/4 ≈ 0.242. In other words, in our
attempt to reduce variance in one line we have worsened
the variance metric by approximately a factor of 20. If we
reduce D from 10 to 3 the metric for the new solution is
approximately 0.098 and thus more than 8 times larger than
that for the original solution.
To conclude this section we point out that:
1) In either case, a cursory analysis might seem to reveal
that any solution to the security-constrained problem
will concentrate variance on line ab. That is not so:
as we have shown, we can shift variance to the path
from bus k + 1 to b. This approach, however, both
increases cost and system variance. Also note that on the
surface the network design above makes sense: cheaper
participating generators are closer to the load.
2) The system we have discussed has been expressly
designed so as to evince an extreme behavior. And,
of course, different parameter choices will result in
less extreme behavior. However we caution the reader
that the example can be modified by introducing more
participating generators and additional loads, with the
appropriate cost and security structure, to obtain a sys-
tem setup that is not at first glance extreme, while the
actual behavior does become even more extreme than
the one we provided. Moreover the qualitative behavior
we have discussed can be seen in realistic examples.
3) The behavior we see in the example, in summary, is one
where network topology, load structure (i.e. location of
loads, stochastic injection nodes and responding buses)
and cost structure conspire so as to concentrate variance
on a specific line or more generally a small set of lines.
As the example shows, we can expect an inherent set of trade-
offs between operational cost, system-wide variance metrics,
and variance on selected (“important”) lines. This tradeoff
is one that should be visible to and controllable by system
operators. Next section addresses this point.
V. VARIANCE-AWARE PROBLEMS
In this section we consider modifications to the process
of solving formulation (15), so as to capture tradeoffs with
variance metrics. As a starting point in this direction, we
formulate an optimization problem of the general type
min
∑
i∈G
E(ci(pi)) + ∆(f¯ , s
2) (19a)
s.t. 15b - 15i (19b)
where s2 is the vector with entries s2ij (variances of line flows),
and
∆(f¯ , s2) =
∑
ij∈F
∆ij(f¯ij , s
2
ij), (20)
Here, F ⊆ E and each ∆ij is a nonnegative function chosen
to highlight a specific penalty as a function of expected flow
and variance. In other words, we impose all constraints of the
safety-constrained problem (15) but we add to the objective a
term that enforces a tradeoff with variance. The function ∆
will be our formal “variance metric.”
A. Some variance metrics
Next we describe some concrete models of variance metrics
(20).
(I) F = E , and for all ij ∈ E , ∆ij is convex and nondecreas-
ing in s2ij . As a special case, let ∆ij(f¯ij , sij) = ψijs
2
ij
where ψij ≥ 0. When ψij = 1 or ψij = (1/fmaxij )2
∆(f¯ , s2) is the metric we considered in the examples
given in Section IV .
(II) More complex models are those where F = F(f¯ , s2).
For example let N > 0 be given, and consider a function
∆ of the form
∆(f¯ , s) =
∑
ij∈F
ψijs
2
ij (21)
where again the ψij ≥ 0 are scalars, and F ⊆ E is a set
of lines, such as
(II.1) The set of N lines with largest flow magnitude.
(II.2) The set of N lines with largest flow variance.
In either model, we do not know in advance the set F to
be summed over, yet the objective is relevant.
(III) A very different class of convex models is that where for
each ij we define ∆ij(f¯ij , sij) as follows:
∆ij = − ρij log(s2ij − b2ijγijΩγTij), if s2ij > b2ijγijΩγTij
= +∞, otherwise.
where ρij > 0 is a parameter. This is the classical
logarithmic barrier formulation [21]. Because of the
definition of the ∆ij , the conic constraints (15h) can
be removed. It is known that if the ρij are all equal
to a common value ρ, then the solution to (19) (with
(15h) removed) converges to an optimal solution to the
security-constrained problem (15) as ρ→ 0+. For a fixed
choice of the ρij we obtain a ranking of the importance
of (security of) individual lines, plus a tradeoff against
generation cost. The formulation (19) may thus be seen
as a viable alternative to safety-constrained formulations,
without the computational burden of the conic constraints
(15h).
In model (I) we obtain a standard second-order cone program.
Model (III) is also convex, though nonstandard (i.e. not an
SOCP). Model (II.2) can be formulated as a convex program
(proof omitted).
B. A correction template
Our goal in this work is to address the tradeoff between
generation cost, security constraints and variance metrics, and
one way to do so is to solve the optimization problem (19),
which is in principle a straightforward task in model (I).
However, previous experience with chance-constrained DC-
OPF [3], [6] indicates that a direct solution approach relying
on state-of-the-art solvers is likely to fail due to numerical
difficulties. Our numerical tests with formulation (19) in model
(I) verifies this fact.
As an alternative to formal optimization we instead focus
on a procedure that seeks to correct or adjust the solution
to the non-variance aware safety-constrained problem (15). A
template for the overall scheme is as follows.
Template V.1. GENERIC CORRECTION TEMPLATE
Input: an instance of the safety-constrained problem
(15) and a variance metric.
Step I. Solve (15), with solution (p¯∗,A∗).
Step II. Perform a small number of adjustment
iterations which shift (p¯∗,A∗) to a new feasible
solution to (15) that attains an improved value of the
variance metric, while at the same time increasing
generation cost in a moderate manner.
We will describe an implementation of Step II where we
perform first- or second-order steps that amount to solving
convex optimization problems which do not include large
numbers of conic constraints.
Prior to describing the specific implementation we briefly
discuss the motivation for using this template. As has been
observed in prior work, in the solution to typical chance-
constrained problems similar to (15), only very a small number
of the conic constraints (15h) are binding or nearly binding,
that is to say, only a small number of safety constraints are
active. If some of those lines are among those with largest
flow (literally, a handful) we expect that their variance will
also be fairly small. However, there generally is a relatively
large number of lines with quite large variance of flow. It
follows that there is “low hanging fruit”, i.e. opportunities for
shifting variance so as to improve a given variance metric. In
doing so, we may slightly increase the variance of lines with
nearly-binding safety-constraints. This increase may require a
correspondingly slight decrease of flow in such lines, so as to
satisfy the safety constraints. Flow will thus be shifted onto
other lines, possibly resulting in a small increase in cost. These
expectations are borne out in experiments detailed below, and
they form the underpinning for the above template.
C. A specific implementation for the template
Here we describe an implementation of the above template.
For simplicity of exposition, we assume that
(1) For each line ij, ∆ij(f¯ij , s2ij) = ∆ij(s2ij), i.e. it is a
function of line variance only. Further, it is assumed that
∆ij(s
2
ij) is convex and nondecreasing.
(2) The set F used to define ∆(f¯ , s2) in (20) does not
depend on the variances, i.e. F = F(f¯).
Assumptions (1) and (2) match models (I) and (II.1)
above. However we stress that there are variants of the
procedures below that handle cases (II.2) and (III).
Definition V.2. Let f¯ be a power flow vector and let A ∈ K
be a matrix of participation factors. We will say that the
pair (f¯ ,A) is compatible (or that A is compatible with f¯ )
for problem (15), if there exist p¯, θ¯, D, γ and s such that
(p¯, f¯ , θ¯,A, D, γ, s) is feasible for (15).
Informally, a pair (f¯ ,A) is compatible if they give rise to
a feasible solution to the safety-constrained problem (15).
Our implementation relies on two optimization problems
that are repeatedly solved in Procedure V.3 given below. We
describe these two problems next. Let 0 < τ < 1 be fixed. The
first optimization problem is denoted by Reroute(Aˆ, τ), and
uses as inputs a compatible pair (fˆ , Aˆ) and vector sˆ2 = V(A)
of line flow variances arising from Aˆ.
min
p¯,f¯ ,θ¯
∑
i∈G
ci0(p¯
2
i + AˆTi ΩAˆi) + ci1p¯i + ci2 (22a)
s.t. Bθ¯ = p¯+ µ− d (22b)
bij |f¯ij |+ νij sˆij ≤ (1− τ)fmaxij ∀ij ∈ E , (22c)
f¯ij = bij(θ¯i − θ¯j) ∀ij ∈ E , (22d)
∀i ∈ G :
pmini + νi
√
AˆTi ΩAˆi ≤ p¯i ≤ pmaxi − νi
√
AˆTi ΩAˆi. (22e)
Comments: This optimization problem minimizes expected
generation cost using the fixed participation factors Aˆ; it
imposes stricter line safety constraints (with line limits reduced
by the factor 1 − τ ). Assuming Reroute(Aˆ, τ) is feasible,
let an optimal solution be (p¯∗, f¯∗, θ¯∗). Then, by construction
of Reroute(Aˆ, τ), (f¯∗, Aˆ) is compatible for (15), with
some slack. A large choice for τ may of course render
Reroute(Aˆ, τ) infeasible. However we will be choosing
small values for τ , which as a corollary implies that the
expected generation cost accrued by p¯∗ will be slightly larger
than that entailed by the flow fˆ .
The second problem takes as input a compatible pair (f¯ ′,A′).
Also, for ij ∈ E let s′ij =
√
V(A′)ij , the standard deviation
of flow on ij using participation factors A′. Finally, let
T(f¯ ′,A′, τ) be the set of lines for which the safety constraint
is nearly tight under participation factors A′, that is to say:
T(f¯ ′,A′, τ) = { ij ∈ E : |f¯ ′ij |+ νijs′ij ≥ (1− τ)fmaxij }.
The problem, denoted by VShift(f¯ ′,A′, τ), is as follows.
min
s,A
∑
ij∈F(f ′)
∆ij(s
2
ij) (23a)
s.t. A ∈ K (23b)
s2ij ≥ b2ijpiTij(I −A)Ω(I −AT )piij ∀ ij ∈ E (23c)
|f¯ ′ij | + νij sij ≤ fmaxij ∀ij ∈ T(f ′,A′, τ). (23d)
Comments. Since the ∆ij are increasing, at optimality
constraint (23c) will be binding. Thus the optimization
problem is selecting a participation matrix that minimizes
the variance metric. Constraint (23d) stipulates that on lines
ij ∈ T(f ′,A′, τ) the matrix A is compatible with the input
flow f ′. Problem (23) is convex and when the ∆ij are
quadratic it is an SOCP; its relative difficulty depends on the
number of constraints (23d) which, as we have discussed, is
frequently quite small.
We now use the two optimization problems to develop an
algorithm.
Procedure V.3. Variance-shifting
Input: Feasible solution (p¯0, f0,A0) to safety-
constrained problem (15), variance metric ∆,
parameters 0 < τ < 1, K > 0. Let s20 = V(A0).
For k = 1, 2, . . . ,K perform iteration k:
1. Solve Reroute(Ak−1, τ).
If infeasible, STOP.
Else, let (p¯k, f¯k, θ¯k) be the optimal solution.
2. Solve VShift(f¯k,Ak−1, τ), with solution (ˆsk, Aˆk).
3. Choose 0 < λ ≤ 1 largest, so that
(f¯k, (1− λ)Ak−1 + λAˆk) is compatible.
4. Set Ak ← (1− λ)Ak−1 + λAˆk, s2k = V(Ak).
5. If ∆(f¯k, s2k) ≥∆(f¯k−1, s2k−1). STOP.
Reset τ ← τ/2.
A formal analysis of this algorithm, which is motivated
by Nesterov’s smoothing techniques for non-smooth problems
[22]2, is provided in the Appendix. Intuitively, in Step 1 the
algorithm reroutes flow so as so as to create slack capacity
in lines, while keeping a constant participation matrix (so
that variances remain constant). In Step 2 we compute a new
participation matrix which is not required to be compatible
with the flow vector computed in Step 1, but should improve
on the variance metric because of the typically small number
of constraints (23d).
Finally, in Steps 3-4 we take a convex combination of the
previous and the new participation matrices so as to obtain
compatibility. It is straightforward to prove that for any line
ij, the quantity V((1− t)Ak−1 + tAˆk)ij is a convex quadratic
function over 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and so the stepsize computation can
be performed exactly (see Appendix).
Typically, ∆(f¯k, sˆ2k) < ∆(f¯
k, sˆ2k−1) (since (ˆsk, Aˆk) solves
the problem in Step 2). Thus, in order to obtain a large
improvement in variance metric, we want the stepsize λ to
be large. This is the reason why constraint (23d) is needed
in problem VShift(f¯k,Ak−1, τ): without such a constraint a
line ij in T(f¯k,Ak−1, τ) would enforce a short step if sˆk,ij
is large. Also, as stated the procedure may halt in Step 1. This
need not be the case by relying on the expedient of resetting
τ to a smaller value (e.g., half) and repeating Step 1 until
feasibility is attained. A more comprehensive solution would
be to perform a combination of Step 1 and Step 2, effectively
a first-order gradient step, so as to move away from the current
point. We have not implemented this patch as it did not prove
necessary for small values of τ and K.
2With ∆ playing the role of a “potential” function.
In the Appendix we will prove an important result concern-
ing the above procedure under model (I) of the variance metric
(Section V-A). Let ∆∗ be the minimum variance metric over
all compatible pairs, i.e.
∆∗ .= min{∆(f¯ ,V(A)) : (f¯ ,A) compatible}, (24)
Theorem 5. Under model (I) if Procedure (V.3) stops at Step
5 of iteration k then ∆(f¯k−1, s2k−1) = ∆
∗.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Here we consider numerical examples based on
“case2746wp” available through MATPOWER [23], with
2746 buses, 3514 branches, 520 generators and sum of loads
24873. We have added 22 stochastic injection sites, with
sum of mean injections 4611.57 (approx. 18.5% penetration)
and average ratio of standard deviation to mean of 0.3. Our
experiment proceeded as follows.
Step 1. First, solve the safety-constrained problem (15) with
all safety parameters set to 3 (three standard deviations). All
generators are available for balancing. This process required
29 iterations of the cutting-plane algorithm in [3] or [9]
and consumed approximately one CPU minute in a standard
workstation, using CPLEX 12.6 [24] as the underlying SOCP
solver.
Step 2. We then applied the Procedure V.3 with τ = 0.1
and K = 2. The set of buses used to balance stochastic
deviations, R, was the subset of generating buses that was
selected in Step 1, of cardinality 11. We expand on Step 2 next.
We used, for variance metric, a nonconvex example of
model (II) in Section V-A . The variance metric we used was∑
ij∈F
s2ij , (25)
i.e. the sum of flow variances in lines in set F . At any iteration
k of procedure V.3, the set F used to define (25) is the union
of two sets:
(a) The 100 lines with largest flow.
(b) Those lines for which the safety constraint is nearly bind-
ing, i.e. lines ij for which |f¯ij |+ νijsij ≥ (1− τ)fmaxij
(“nearly-binding” lines).
This problem is quintessentially non-convex and it is of
interest to see whether our iterative procedure can indeed
reduce the metric. A summary of the run is as follows:
Iteration k = 1, Step 1. Requires 1.12 seconds, optimal
expected generation cost ≈ 1.1× 1006.
Iteration k = 1, Step 2. The output of Step 1 produced a set of
nearly-binding lines of cardinality 5; so that |F| = 105, with
variance metric (25) of value 6.3 × 1004. The optimization
problem (23) had approximately 140000 variables and a
similar number of constraints and approximately one million
nonzeros. Its solution, using Gurobi 7.02 [25], required 2.32
seconds. The variances sˆ21 yield metric ≈ 2.3× 1004.
Iteration k = 1, Step 3. Here, λ ≈ 0.55.
Iteration k = 1, Steps 4 and 5. The variances s21 yield a
metric of value ≈ 4.65× 1004.
Summary. One iteration of Procedure V.3 keeps expected
generation approximately constant and reduces variance
metric by approximately 35%.
Iteration k = 2, Step 1. Similar runtime, expected
generation cost remains nearly same.
Iteration k = 2, Step 2. The number of nearly-binding
branches is now 24 with F = 120. Solution statistics are
similar to those for iteration 1. The variance metric attained
by sˆ22 is 2.89× 1004.
Iteration k = 2, Step 3. Here, λ ≈ 0.29.
Iteration k = 2, Steps 4 and 5. The variances s22 yield a
metric of value 4.50× 1004.
Summary. Two iterations of Procedure V.3 again keep
expected cost nearly constant, but reduce variance metric by
roughly 40% relative to the original value.
It is also instructive to look at the structure of the power
flows. At termination, the largest magnitude expected flow is
of approximately of value 817. The third largest flow has
value 632 and attains the largest single standard deviation,
of value approximately 91. In contrast, the 101st largest flow
value is approximately 144 and lines at or below that ranking
of flow magnitude have much smaller standard deviation of
flow; approximately 15. Thus the procedure shifts variance
away from high flow lines but also without creating very high
variance, low expected flow lines. Of course, other choices for
the variance metric ∆ will produce different tradeoffs.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we have described efficient computational
procedures that postprocess security-constrained DC-OPF so-
lutions toward nearly-optimal solutions that attain significantly
lower variance metrics. In future work we plan to explore
alternative metrics, for example to capture engineering details,
through the use of derivative-free optimization [26].
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IX. APPENDIX
Here we provide the technical analysis underpinning Proce-
dure V.3.
Remark 6. Let A,A′ ∈ K. Then for any 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, (1− t)+
A + tA′ ∈ K and for any line ij, V((1 − t)A + tA′)ij is a
convex quadratic function of t.
Proof. The first claim follows since K is convex and the second
using expression (8).
Lemma 7. Suppose that in iteration k the algorithm reaches
Step 2. Let (f¯ ,A) be an arbitrary compatible pair. Then there
exists 0 < γ ≤ 1 such that for all 0 ≤ t ≤ γ,
( (1− t)f¯k + tf¯ , (1− t)Ak−1 + tA )
is a compatible pair.
Proof. Consider any line ij. For real 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 let s2ij(t) =
V((1− t)A(k−1) + tA). By construction in Step 1,
|f¯kij |+ νijsij(0) ≤ (1− τ)fmaxij .
Since s2ij(t) is a quadratic function of t and thus continuous,
it follows that there exists γij > 0 such that
|f¯kij |+ νijsij(t) ≤ fmaxij
for all t ≤ γij . The quantity γij can be computed exactly
using e.g. (8) to obtain an explicit representation of s2ij(t).
The result follows using γ = minij γij .
Recall that ∆∗ is the minimum variance metric over all
compatible pairs (24), and define
(f¯∗,A∗) .= argmin{∆(f¯ ,V(A)) : (f¯ ,A) compatible},
Lemma 8. Suppose that in iteration k the algorithm reaches
Step 2 and that ∆∗ < ∆(f¯k, s2k−1). Let γ be as in Lemma 7,
and write
s2(γ)
.
= V((1− γ)A(k−1) + γA∗).
Then
∆(f¯k, s2(γ)) < ∆(f¯k, s2k−1).
Proof. Apply Lemma 7 with A = A∗ to obtain γ as in (a).
To prove (b) consider any line ij. Since for any line ij, the
function s2ij(t) is a convex quadratic function of t, s
2
ij(γ) ≤
(1−γ)s2ij(0)+γs2ij(1), and therefore, since ∆ij(s2ij) is convex
and nondecreasing in sij ,
∆ij(s
2
ij(γ)) ≤ (1− γ)∆ij(s2ij(0)) + γ∆ij(s2ij(1)).
Summing this expression over F(f¯k) we obtain
∆(f¯k, s2(γ)) ≤ (1− γ)∆(f¯k, s2k−1) + γ∆∗ < ∆(f¯k, s2k−1)
where the last inequality holds because γ > 0.
Comment: Lemma (8) shows that under very general
conditions the variance-shifting Step 2 of Procedure V.3 does
lead to a reduction in variance metric. In fact,
Lemma 9. Under model (I) of the variance metric
∆(f¯k, s2k) < ∆(f¯
k−1, s2k−1) unless ∆(f¯
k−1, s2k−1) = ∆
∗.
Proof. Under model (I) we have F = E in (20). Hence
∆(f¯k, s2k−1) = ∆(f¯
k−1, s2k−1). The result now follows from
Lemma 8. In other words we obtain Theorem 5 .
